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Abstract
Policies banning women domestic workers from migrating overseas have long been
imposed by labour-sending states in the Indo-Pacific region. This article presents the
complexities surrounding such bans by developing an overarching model of a
migration ban policy cycle, which provides a theoretical framework for
understanding the circumstances under which migration bans arise and play out. It
examines the history of migration bans for four prominent labour-sending states –
Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka - to assess the causes, outcomes and
extent of regional convergence of these policies. In doing so, we uncover two
prominent policy narratives. The first involves labour diplomacy, where countries
employ bans to negotiate superior working conditions and rights for migrant
workers. The second concerns paternalist states as ‘protector’, where states are
primarily motivated to reaffirm traditional gender norms. We conclude that migration
bans have been most effective, both in curbing departures and achieving desired
outcomes, when they are primarily motivated by labour issues and not gender
politics. Nevertheless, even when used as a form of diplomatic negotiation, migration
bans heighten the vulnerability of domestic workers to exploitation by pushing them
into irregular pathways fraught with risk.
Keywords: Migrant domestic workers, Gender, Migration ban, Indo-Pacific, Migration
policy
Introduction: migration bans in the Indo-Pacific
On 3rd January 2020, the Philippine government issued a total ban on the migration of
domestic workers to Kuwait following the death of Filipina domestic worker Jeanelyn
Villavende the previous month. Villavende was allegedly physically and sexually abused
by her Kuwaiti employers and died from ‘multiple, severe, traumatic injuries’ (Gulf
News, 2020). This follows a temporary ban on Filipinos migrating to Kuwait for work
2 years prior, amid investigations into the deaths of seven Filipino domestic workers
(Human Rights Watch, 2018), including the high-profile murder of Joanna Demafelis
(The Telegraph , 2018). While that ban eventuated in a Memorandum of Understand-
ing [MOU] between the two countries, the reinstatement of restrictions in 2020
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highlights the cyclical nature of migration bans as negotiating instruments. Indeed,
both bans are only the most recent examples of a long-standing policy response by the
Philippines and other labour-sending states to ongoing rights abuses in West Asia,
which remains the largest destination region for domestic workers migrating across the
Indo-Pacific (International Labour Organization, 2016).
Bans affecting women migrants stretch back to the early years of domestic worker
migration to the Gulf, with the government of Bangladesh repeatedly banning or
restricting the overseas migration of certain categories of ‘low-skilled’ women workers
from early 1981 to 1998 (International Labour Organization, 2014). Since then, there
have been periodic attempts by numerous labour-sending states to restrict the migra-
tion of workers identified as being particularly vulnerable to abuse and mistreatment,
including fairly recent bans by the governments of Cambodia (2011), Sri Lanka (2013),
Nepal (2014) and Indonesia (2015). These migration bans have been applied, almost ex-
clusively, to women migrant domestic workers [MDWs], who are widely perceived to
be at greater risk of harm due to the circumstances of their employment.
However, the bans can also be mired by paternalist political currents emerging from
antagonism between traditional gender norms and the encroaching ‘modernity’ of in-
creasing female labour force participation (Oishi, 2005). Although migration bans often
appear to be enforced in a piecemeal and reactive fashion, they have been embraced by
an increasing number of countries and used more frequently over time, drawing nas-
cent academic and civil society attention to their efficacy as a potential mechanism for
negotiating better wages and conditions for MDWs (Napier-Moore, 2017; Oishi, 2005).
Beyond these discussions, though, there has been little comparative analysis of the vary-
ing political logics behind migration bans, the extent to which they might reflect extant
gender norms or economic constraints, and emergent patterns of policy convergence
or divergence within and between sub-regional contexts.
For all the academic attention directed toward the comparative analysis of policy re-
gimes governing international migration, there has been a disproportionate emphasis
on the immigration policies of OECD countries with net migration inflows. The charac-
terisation of wealthy countries as principal countries of destination reflects a knowledge
production preoccupied with the political and economic apprehensions of the Global
North, and belies the demographic reality that most of the world’s international mi-
grants now move between countries of the Global South (Hujo & Piper, 2010; United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), 2019). The compara-
tive study of migration regimes within these countries has been limited (Boucher &
Gest, 2015) and, where there is existing scholarship, largely confined to analysis of the
rigid immigration policies that maintain the supply of low-wage temporary migrant
labour to major countries of destination in West, East and Southeast Asia.
However, migration regimes are mutually constituted by immigration and emigration
policies, and among countries of origin whose economies have long been inextricably
linked to the vicissitudes of temporary labour migration there are diverse examples of
policies intended to promote or curtail foreign employment. Of these, migration bans
or restrictions for women domestic workers are perhaps the most commonplace and
controversial, yet have remained under-researched at a regional level. Identifying a la-
cuna in the dearth of cross-national comparisons of partial or total bans on domestic
worker migration, we examine the history of migration bans in four prominent labour-
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sending states in the Indo-Pacific region – Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri
Lanka – to assess the causes, outcomes and extent of regional convergence of these
policies. Our attention is focused on the migration policies of these South and South-
east Asian countries for reasons of similarity and difference. There are obvious paral-
lels, for example, in the sheer prevalence of temporary labour migration as a livelihood
strategy: poorer households in all four countries have looked to foreign employment in
the absence of substantive local employment opportunities. Commensurately, the col-
lective remittances flowing into each of these countries has been a significant and
growing source of developmental capital (World Bank, 2019).
Amid these broad commonalities are important differences. For Nepal and Sri Lanka,
labour migration has primarily involved low-wage employment in the oil-producing
economies of the Gulf. Yet, while official statistics indicate that Nepal has low rates of
female domestic worker migration in keeping with longstanding restrictions, Sri Lanka’s
migration pattern has been highly feminised, with MDWs accounting for the majority
of departures until the introduction of restrictions in 2013 (Weeraratne, 2016). Tem-
porary labour migration from Indonesia and the Philippines, meanwhile, has also been
highly feminised but more diverse in terms of destination regions and the occupational
profile of workers. Indonesian MDWs had been fairly evenly split between West and
East/Southeast Asia until the introduction of a 2011 ban on women working in the
Gulf, and continues to occur alongside smaller feminised migration flows into light
manufacturing industries. While Filipina migrant workers labour across a range of oc-
cupations, notably as nurses and skilled caregivers, the vast majority are domestic
workers spread across Asia and Europe with flows fluctuating in accordance with peri-
odic country-specific bans.
What emerges are diverse histories of temporary labour migration flows and accom-
panying emigration policies that are united by their focus on women MDWs but also
straddle a gamut of cultural and political logics. In the first section, we draw out two
major crosscutting themes – the feminisation of employment and the politicisation of
gender norms – to provide contextual background to the emergence of migration bans.
We then develop a ‘migration ban policy cycle’ that provides a theoretical framework
for understanding the circumstances under which migration bans arise and play out. In
the following section, we demonstrate variations in our model through historical over-
views of feminised migration, gender norms and migration restrictions in each of our
four country studies. In the final section, we examine these bans from historical and re-
gional perspectives to explore patterns of convergence and divergence in policy think-
ing and assess the efficacy of recent interventions. We conclude that migration bans
have been most effective, both in curbing departures and achieving desired outcomes,
when they are primarily motivated by labour issues and not gender politics. Neverthe-
less, even when used as a form of diplomatic negotiation, evidence suggests that they
increase the vulnerability of domestic workers to exploitation by pushing them into ir-
regular pathways fraught with risk.
The policy origins of migration bans
In this section we highlight the feminisation of employment and the politicisation of
gender norms as prevalent themes that inform the policy origins of migration bans ap-
plicable to women domestic workers. We situate these two factors as exerting differing
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degrees of policy influence across labour-sending states, with the relative weighting of
either factor altering the shape and course of migration ban policies.
Feminisation of employment
The feminisation of employment is a common thread in the modern political economy
of the four countries discussed in this article, as it has been across much of the world.
As Standing (1989, 1999) has argued, ‘feminisation’ not only implies increases to female
labour force participation rates, but substantive alterations to the gendered division of
labour itself. Examples of such shifts can include the concentration of women workers
in particular industries and occupations, the feminisation of jobs traditionally per-
formed by men, or a more generalised trend towards a labour market characterised by
the precarity that has historically accompanied women’s work (Standing, 1999). In each
case, feminisation is more a process of labour market segmentation and deregulation
than it is a gender rebalancing of participation in paid work. Indeed, Elson and Pearson
(1981) long ago argued that the feminisation of employment across the emerging econ-
omies of Asia had occurred alongside integration with competitive export markets and
predicated on leveraging gender discrimination to cut labour costs. On the factory
floor, essentialised gendered traits associated with household work – in this case,
women’s ‘nimble fingers’ – have been refracted through the lens of production to sim-
ultaneously devalue the work performed and benchmark higher productivity (Elson &
Pearson, 1981). Women have thus been categorically subjected to intensified exploit-
ation at work, yet, with their employment ensconced within prevailing gender norms
and characterised as an extension of household labour, seldom experience commensur-
ate readjustments to the unpaid care work they perform, even as they become de facto
breadwinners for their families (International Labour Organization, 2018a).
We understand the feminisation of employment through the proliferation of domes-
tic worker migration in a similar vein. International domestic worker migration has
been a major avenue of women’s employment across the poorer regions of Asia since
the 1970s and, by way of remitted income, a vital source of foreign exchange earnings
for the countries those workers originate from (Withers, 2019). Domestic worker mi-
gration has become one of the largest occupational categories for women in each of the
countries we discuss (International Labour Organization, 2013). Yet, like sewing gar-
ments, domestic work is framed as an extension of innately ‘feminine’ work: essentially
the commodification of various forms of unpaid care work that women overwhelmingly
perform within their own homes. As such, it is work that is typically construed as ‘un-
skilled’ and, owing to the oligopolistic characteristics of international demand for do-
mestic work and the absence of substantive labour laws in prominent countries of
destination (Wickramasekara, 2016), chronically devalued. Short-term and low-wage
domestic worker migration to West Asia has taken place under the limited rights
afforded by the kafala system since the 1970s, while similarly rigid migration to
Singapore and Hong Kong began en masse in the 1980s before diversifying to other
emerging economies in East and Southeast Asia (Oishi, 2005). There has been little al-
teration to the immigration and employment policies of major countries of destination
that have come to rely on temporary migrant workers to perform ‘3D jobs’ – the dirty,
dangerous and demeaning.
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Domestic worker migration across Asia has thus been a form of feminised employ-
ment that has some ‘typical’ features: an increase in female breadwinners, accompany-
ing tensions within established gender norms, and devaluation of women’s labour,
while also possessing some situationally-dependent issues related to working trans-
nationally (i.e. the implicit reorganisation of unpaid care work in migrant households
and difficulties enforcing MDW’s human and labour rights in third countries). Of these
emergent implications, we identify disruptions to traditional gender norms along with
the political and economic implications of exploitation as the most common motiva-
tions for the emergence of policies that seek to ban migrant domestic work.
Gender norms
Women from key labour-sending states in Asia have undoubtedly pushed the gendered
frontiers of the productive sphere forward through their rising participation as inde-
pendent labour migrants in the global market. However, the feminisation of overseas
labour migration conflicts with prevailing gender norms across Asia with respect to
women’s roles and identities in the reproductive sphere (Asis et al., 2004). Traditional
gendered ideals still depict men to be breadwinners and legitimate labour migrants,
while women are portrayed as obedient, domesticated citizens located primarily in the
private sphere of the home as nurturing mothers and wives (Chan, 2014; Platt, 2018).
Therefore, ‘women who move to make a living are deemed out of place’ (Khoo et al.,
2017, 327). Women’s economic contributions from paid work - both at home and
overseas - remain subordinate to their domestic responsibilities, as it is considered a
male responsibility to support families financially.
The emergence of ‘female breadwinners’ alongside waning male employment – par-
ticularly in rural areas where traditional agricultural livelihoods have faltered – has
placed these norms under stress, resulting in commonplace stigmatisation of working
women (Lynch, 2007) and stubborn expectations that women should, irrespective of
their paid work commitments or their spouses’ lack thereof, perform the bulk of unpaid
care work and particularly childcare (Gunatilaka, 2013). This patriarchal familial ideol-
ogy is now explicitly incorporated into state policy in many instances, which demon-
strates the underlying unease towards women’s migration despite enabling conditions
presented by gendered migration systems and recruitment practices (Khoo et al., 2017).
For example, women in Sri Lanka and Indonesia are required to obtain permission
from their spouse or male guardian in order to migrate overseas as domestic workers
(International Labour Organization, 2018b; Platt, 2018). Women’s access to labour mi-
gration not only hinges on their ability to convince their husband or father to provide
consent as her ‘protector’, but in the case of Sri Lanka, it also rests on the government
and employment agency to endorse, monitor and evaluate a woman’s caregiver role
(International Labour Organization, 2018b). Despite women’s significant contribution
to national development, such policies reinforce the traditional ideology of mother as
primary caregiver and moral guardian of the family and father as head-of-household
(Abeyasekera & Jayasundere, 2015; Withers, 2019). Women’s overseas labour migration,
therefore, ‘remains couched in notions of domesticated dependency – including their
dependency upon their husbands, and children’s dependency upon their mothers’
(Platt, 2018, 93).
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Accordingly, states permit and encourage the migration of women on the condition
that they do not neglect their domestic duties (Chan, 2014). The continuing promotion
of women’s overseas employment, however, suggests that labour-sending states expect
women to fulfil a dual role in both the wage-earning sphere and domestic sphere. This
vision of idealised femininity translates into a ‘migratory income-earning woman for
the sake of the “national family’s” larger goal of economic development, a process of
transnational domestication’ (Silvey, 2004, 253). Thus, labour-sending states encourage,
and in some instances, coerce migrant women into remitting their wages back home to
their families (Guevarra, 2006). In this way, women migrants are represented as ‘eco-
nomic heroes’ or ‘martyrs’ carrying out a feminine familial duty as ‘good’ mothers,
daughters and wives whose remittances ‘save’ their countries, communities and house-
holds (Chan, 2014).
The migration ban policy cycle
The extent to which the feminisation of employment and entrenched gender norms in-
form migration policies varies substantially among labour-sending states, including the
four countries highlighted in this study. We nonetheless suggest that it is possible to
identify a broadly generalisable model of a migration ban policy cycle that is catalysed
by a ‘crisis event’, subject to various forms of contestation and negotiation, and ultim-
ately results in a corrective policy change through which migration bans are eased or
revoked. In this section, we offer a broad four-stage policy model to illustrate the cir-
cumstances under which migration bans typically arise and play out.
As per Fig. 1, below, we postulate that migration bans are likely to follow a predict-
able policy cycle, progressing through four generalisable stages that may nonetheless
contain important differences arising from the ways in which women’s work is socially
and economically situated within different labour-sending states.
Stage 1: crisis event
Total or conditional bans preventing women domestic workers from migrating to cer-
tain countries or regions are typically implemented after a ‘crisis event’ involving the
Fig. 1 Migration Ban Policy Cycle
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abuse or death of a woman migrant worker during foreign employment. Such events
readily capture public and media attention, leading to public outrage in labour-sending
states (Shivakoti, 2020). Some examples of ‘crisis events’ that have led to the introduc-
tion of a migration ban on women domestic workers are listed in the table below for
each of our four country studies (Table 1).
During a crisis event, sending states must choose quickly from a limited set of policy
options. Shivakoti (2020) lists three policy options frequently employed in such cases: i)
do nothing; ii) find a diplomatic solution or; iii) introduce a total or partial migration
ban. The ‘do nothing’ approach has frequently worked for governments as they attempt
to wait until the crisis blows over and is no longer the focus of public attention. The
second, more challenging, option is to work with the destination country to find a
diplomatic solution to the crisis. However, a significant power imbalance between
labour-sending and receiving countries is usually present, which fosters unwillingness
on behalf of the host state to change its domestic laws to appease countries of origin.
The third option, and one that has been adopted repeatedly by labour-sending states
across the Indo-Pacific region, involves total or partial bans on the migration of women
domestic workers with the rationale of ‘protecting’ them from possible abuse and ex-
ploitation. While this seems to be an extreme option in the governments’ policy toolkit,
it is also the most convenient option. By implementing a migration ban the government
appears decisive during a time of crisis, which mollifies public anger.
Stage 2: policy confusion and resistance
Once a migration ban is in place, it may lead to some policy confusion as the changing
nature of its requirements, such as age and country-specific restrictions, can be difficult
for migrant workers to understand and adhere to. In practice, the consequences of the
migration bans are counter to those intended by labour-sending states. By closing legal
avenues for migration, while at the same time failing to provide viable employment and
economic opportunities within the home country, the governments’ bans push women
who hope to migrate as domestic workers for reasons such as poverty and debt to do
so irregularly (International Labour Organization, 2015; Weeraratne, 2016). It is well
documented that when women domestic workers bypass regular migration processes
they are more vulnerable to rights violations and abuse during recruitment and while
overseas, as a result of their irregular status (Napier-Moore, 2017). During migration
bans, prospective women MDWs do not have access to pre-departure information and
training, standard employment contracts, and grievance mechanisms (Napier-Moore,
Table 1 Crisis Events Prior to Migration Bans
Country Date Crisis Event
Philippines 1995 Execution of Filipina domestic worker Flor Contemplacion in Singapore for the alleged
murder of a child in her care and a fellow domestic worker.
2018 The discovery of murdered domestic worker Joanna Demafelis in Kuwait.
Nepal 1998 Suicide of Kani Sherpa due to physical violence and rape from her employer in Saudi
Arabia.
Indonesia 2011 Execution of Ruyati Binti Satubi, a migrant domestic worker in Saudi Arabia.
Sri Lanka 2013 Execution of Rizana Nafeek, a young domestic worker charged with murder after a child
died in her care in Saudi Arabia.
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2017). The bans provide unscrupulous recruitments agents and employers with more
power to profit from the worker’s undocumented position given the lack of government
oversight. Many MDWs deal with local agents engaged in illicit recruitment and trans-
port practices, involving fake itineraries, circuitous travel routes, bribing corrupt offi-
cials and paying middlemen for escort services (Hamill, 2010).
Stage 3: labour diplomacy
One possibility, after a migration ban has been enacted, is for the country of origin to
work with the country of destination to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Labour-
sending countries with higher bargaining power, such as the Philippines and Indonesia,
have occasionally managed to negotiate better working conditions and rights protec-
tions for migrant workers through a bilateral labour agreement or MOU before agree-
ing to lift the migration ban. For example, the Philippines used the threat of a
migration ban on domestic workers to negotiate a bilateral agreement with Saudi Ara-
bia in 2012 securing better labour protections and a minimum monthly wage of
US$400, despite strong reluctance from the Saudi government. However, it is important
to note that where a new agreement is achieved effective monitoring and implementa-
tion is often lacking, as most are non-binding and informal MOUs or ‘protocols’ (Wick-
ramasekara, 2016). Their less stringent nature is preferred by receiving states who do
not intend to bind themselves with international obligations.
Stage 4: policy change or reversion
In most other instances, negotiation proves too difficult owing to a power asymmetry
between labour-sending and receiving countries. Labour-sending states are at a struc-
tural labour market disadvantage and weak bargaining position to demand more rights
for their migrant workers. Host states have little incentive to change their labour laws
and engage in bilateral negotiations with sending countries because of their relative
bargaining power, which hinges on the abundance of low-cost labour available to be
sourced from countries of origin across the Indo-Pacific region and, increasingly, Af-
rica. Chi (2008) notes how labour-sending states fear that demanding more protection
will lead to the receiving country closing their doors to certain migrant workers and
opening up to competing sending states for their labour ‘supply’. Such fear is not neces-
sarily misplaced. For instance, Saudi Arabia has on several occasions targeted African
countries, including Kenya and Ethiopia, for its labour needs following migration bans
on domestic workers imposed by both the Philippine and Sri Lankan governments. As
negotiations often fail and rates of irregular migration increase, criticism and political
activism from civil society as well as migrant workers themselves can result in a policy
change, such as weakening the specific restrictions of the ban, or a policy reversion by
lifting it entirely.
Operating with a limited policy toolkit, countries that are heavily reliant on domestic
worker migration inevitably confront the social and economic contradictions implicit in
the fictitious commodification of migrant labour – i.e. simultaneously disembedded as a
component of the export economy and enduringly embedded as human lives substanti-
ated by broader social reality – and therein struggle to sustainably appease either im-
perative. Thus, despite differences in labour-sending states’ relative bargaining power
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and the extent to which patriarchal gender norms influence political process, we ob-
serve a general adherence to the migration ban policy cycle described above. However,
these points of difference – and other contextually specific factors – are important in
accounting for contrasting objectives and strategies that play out within the broad arc
of this policy cycle. The following section demonstrates variations in our model in
more detail through historical overviews of feminised migration, gender norms and mi-
gration bans in each of our four country studies.
Country studies
The Philippines
The largest concentration of overseas Filipino workers is in domestic work. After a mo-
mentary decline in 2007 and 2008, following the implementation of the Household Ser-
vice Workers Reform Package, Filipina MDWs have increased and more than doubled
between 2009 and 2012 (Scalabrini Migration Center and International Organization
for Migration, 2013). Women MDWs provide the Philippines with one of its largest
sources of foreign currency; the remittances generated from overseas employment have
become the hallmark of Philippine economic development (Zhou, 2017). The Philip-
pine government’s extraordinary reliance upon remittances has increased since the
1990s. Remittances from overseas Filipino workers reached a new record high of $3.2
billion in 2018, higher by 3.6% compared to the level recorded in the previous year, ac-
counting for 9.7% of GDP in 2018 (Lucas, 2019).
Bans on the migration of women domestic workers have long been a key feature
of overseas employment in the Philippines. It was the first country in the Indo-
Pacific region to establish a practice of ‘labour diplomacy’ through withholding
labour force resources to increase its bargaining power with countries of destin-
ation for better labour rights protections (Napier-Moore, 2017). The Philippine
government first imposed a worldwide ban on the migration of Filipina domestic
workers in 1988 amid complaints of abuse. This had mixed results in terms of
pressuring destination countries to improve migrants’ working conditions. Sixteen
states, including Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore, responded soon after and
signed agreements with the Philippines detailing labour protections (Napier-Moore,
2017). However, many other governments retaliated by slowing down visa process-
ing for all Filipino nationals, affecting so many workers that the Philippine govern-
ment reconsidered the ban. In particular, Kuwait reacted by specifically enforcing a
ban against hiring overseas Filipino workers that lasted 10 years (Sayres, 2007).
Interestingly, countries in West Asia where domestic workers experienced most vi-
olations did not agree to any bilateral negotiations (Oishi, 2005).
Despite the mixed success of the 1988 ban, the Philippine government banned the
migration of domestic workers to Singapore in March 1995 following the highly-
publicised execution of Filipina domestic worker Flor Contemplacion for the murder of
a child in her care and another domestic worker (Yeoh et al., 1999). The Filipino public
depicted Contemplacion as a martyr and national symbol of their economic plight and
participation in overseas employment as a pathway out of poverty (Guevarra, 2006).
Various human rights, feminist and migration groups ‘condemned the Philippine state’s
failure to safeguard the rights of workers deemed crucial to the nation’s economic
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development, and questioned the humanity of its state-sponsored policy of exporting
labour’ (Alipio, 2019, 140).
Since then, the Philippine government has repeatedly enforced country-specific bans
on the migration of women domestic workers in response to increasing complaints of
exploitation. It imposed a ban on the migration of domestic workers to Lebanon in
2006, to Jordan in 2008 and to Saudi Arabia in 2011. The most recent ‘total ban’ to
Kuwait occurred in February 2018, following the death of seven domestic workers and
high-profile murder of Filipina domestic worker Joanna Demafelis (Standing, 1999).
The Philippine government lifted the ban on domestic workers to Kuwait in May 2018
having signed an MOU with the Kuwaiti government, in an attempt to provide overseas
Filipino workers, particularly women MDWs, with additional rights protection in the
Gulf State. However, abuse against domestic workers overseas has persisted, highlight-
ing the ineffectiveness of the MOU. In December 2019, Filipina domestic worker Jeane-
lyn Villavende was raped and murdered by her Kuwaiti employers. In response, the
Philippine government announced in January 2020 that it would once again stop send-
ing domestic workers to Kuwait despite the failure of previous bans to address the mis-
treatment of workers (Gulf News, 2020).
Indonesia
Overseas migration continues to be seen in Indonesia as a mechanism to alleviate the
negative impact of high levels of unemployment especially among women in rural areas
(Elias, 2013). The financial crisis in 1997 hit Indonesia particularly hard and, intersect-
ing with increased demand for women migrants in wealthier states to work in care-
related employment, saw huge numbers of rural women leave the country on tempor-
ary employment contracts (Elias & Louth, 2016). By 2007, women made up 79% of
Indonesian migrant workers with most taking up employment as domestic workers in
Southeast and West Asia (Bank of Indonesia, 2009). Wages remitted by women mi-
grants not only play an increasingly important role in Indonesia’s attempts to ensure
economic stability and development, but to household survival strategies among Indo-
nesia’s poor.
Although women now make a significant contribution to Indonesia’s economy,
ingrained gendered ideals continue to inform state and public discourses regarding
women’s role in everyday life including their labour mobility (Platt, 2018). This is evi-
dent by the stipulation that women must have the express permission of a male guard-
ian (typically a husband or father) in order to migrate overseas (Lindquist, 2010). As
more women enter the paid workforce, they are expected to fulfil a dual role: to meet
their family and marital obligations on the domestic front, while at the same time con-
tribute to Indonesia’s economic development (Austin, 2017).
The Indonesian state has responded to widespread coverage of exploitation and mis-
treatment of women domestic workers overseas in paternalistic ways, such as imple-
menting laws that further restrict their mobility. In late June 2009, the government
placed a ban on its citizens taking up employment in Malaysia as domestic workers fol-
lowing an increase in high profile abuse cases. The government emphasised how this
action reflected not only the problem of violent abuse against domestic workers, but
also the need for better protections and rates of pay for these workers more generally
Shivakoti et al. Comparative Migration Studies            (2021) 9:36 Page 10 of 18
(Elias, 2013). The ban was lifted in 2011 after the respective labour ministries signed a
new MOU, which allowed women domestic workers to retain their passports, entitled
them to a rest day and safeguarded their right to communicate with families and the
embassy.
However, the execution of Indonesian domestic worker, Ruyati Binti Satubi, in Saudi
Arabia in June 2011 prompted the government to once again adopt more drastic re-
strictions on women’s migration. Indonesia imposed a ban on domestic workers from
migrating to the country to pressure Saudi Arabia into agreeing to a new bilateral
agreement offering workers more protection. The government later announced in 2012
that it would stop sending domestic workers abroad altogether by 2017. In May 2015,
the government extended its ban on women domestic workers to 21 countries across
West Asia and North and East Africa following a series of abuse cases and subsequent
public outcry. President Joko Widodo expressed political humiliation, declaring the de-
ployment of women domestic workers ‘a dent in Indonesia’s pride and dignity’ (Platt,
2018, 89). Such national shame might be thought of as ‘reflecting gendered assump-
tions about the inability of the state to protect ‘its’ women’ (Elias, 2013, 403).
Nepal
Temporary labour migration from Nepal is a comparatively recent phenomenon, grow-
ing in volume since the 1990s after Nepal liberalised its migrant labour system. A defin-
ing characteristic since the 2000s is that the destinations for Nepalese migrants are
heavily concentrated in the Gulf States and Malaysia. With increasing numbers of
labour migrants working abroad, Nepal’s dependence on remittances has also steadily
grown over the years, with remittances accounting for 27.3% of its GDP in 2019, aggre-
gating at US$8.1 billion. (World Bank, 2020).
The government has issued over 4 million labour permits to migrant workers since
2008/09, excluding those going to India, Korea and irregular migrants. The Department
of Foreign Employment only began to segregate data for employment permits by sex
from 2005 (Sijapati & Limbu, 2012). The official data shows that 211,893 labour ap-
provals were issued for women in the last decade, which only accounts for a little above
5% of the total share (Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, 2020).
However, this official figure is believed to be inaccurate owing to the recurring partial
or total bans preventing women from pursuing foreign employment, which pushes
them into using irregular channels. The discrepancy in data can be observed by the fact
that Nepali embassies continue to receive requests for assistance from women migrant
workers in larger numbers than the official data suggests. For example, the former Nep-
ali Ambassador to Saudi Arabia estimated that 60,000–70,000 Nepali women were
working as domestic workers in the country despite the ban (Pandey, 2013).
Gendered and paternalistic ideals have long influenced policies governing Nepali
women migrant workers. Until 1998 women were unable to migrate without the writ-
ten approval of a male guardian, such as a father or husband (International Labour
Organization, 2015). A total ban on the migration of women to the Gulf was initially
adopted in 1998 following the death of Nepali domestic worker Kani Sherpa in Kuwait.
It was claimed that she committed suicide after continuous physical and sexual violence
from her employer (International Labour Organization, 2015). Since then, the policy
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has gone through several changes, including the introduction of country-specific bans
and migration bans for women under a certain age or working in certain sectors (Shiva-
koti, 2020). In it latest iteration, the total ban was lifted in 2015 with a new age restric-
tion of 24 years for 8 destination countries. However, in 2017 the Nepal Parliament’s
International Relations and Labour Committee instructed the government to re-
implement the ban on women migrating for domestic work to Gulf States after its field
investigation uncovered widespread abuse and exploitation in the industry (MyRepu-
blica, 2017; Rai, 2020). These bans, which have been lifted periodically and later im-
posed again as policy directives, lack clear information and consistency, making it
difficult for women migrant workers to comprehend and abide by.
By closing legal channels for women to work abroad, without providing alternative
local income opportunities, Nepal’s policy stance has major implications for women mi-
grant workers. The ban has resulted in women migrants not being able to obtain the
official labour permit approval to travel from the Department of Foreign Employment,
which also excludes them from the benefits of financial compensation through the wel-
fare fund in case of injury or death abroad (International Labour Organization, 2015).
Pande (2014) claims that since women are excluded from government protection, they
provide a pool of disposable labour for undesirable jobs in host states while sending re-
mittances back home without imposing any concomitant obligations on their home
country. The policy ban, in its different forms, has not prevented women from migrat-
ing abroad. Rather, they have found ways to circumvent these bans and continue to mi-
grate in search of work through more risky and circuitous routes, usually through the
open border with India.
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka was another relatively late entrant among South Asian countries participating
in domestic worker migration to West Asia, with the first departures commencing in
1977 after restrictions on foreign employment were lifted amid broader reforms to the
economy. Sri Lanka had abruptly transitioned from a ‘closed economy’ predicated on
import-substitution industrialisation to an ‘open economy’ seeking closer integration
with global markets (Kelegama, 2006). Gendered labour market segmentation was a key
part of this shift. Garment factories established in export processing zones were reliant
on women’s low-waged employment, while domestic worker migration to the Gulf –
where heightened demand had arisen from contemporaneous migration bans imple-
mented in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan (Eelens et al., 1992) – was promoted as a
means of securing additional foreign exchange earnings via remittances. Sri Lanka has
since had one of the highest concentrations of migrant domestic worker departures in
the region, with ‘housemaids’ accounting for as much as 75% of all foreign employment
contracts by 1993 (Ministry of Foreign Employment, 2017). Feminised domestic worker
migration has underscored a deepening reliance on remittances, now 8% of GDP and
equivalent to 63% of goods exports (Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), 2018), and has
become a vital component of the country’s external sector.
However, increasing domestic worker migration has also fomented social tension by
disrupting the gendered division of work and care activities. The prevalence of domes-
tic worker migration alongside the waning of traditional masculine livelihoods has
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undermined the male breadwinner model (Gamburd, 2000) without a commensurate
shift in gender norms relating to the performance of unpaid care work and particularly
childcare (Gunatilaka, 2013). The 2013 execution of Rizana Nafeek, a young domestic
worker charged with murder after a child died in her care in Saudi Arabia, served as a
flashpoint for these concerns (International Labour Organization, 2018b). Though ini-
tially provoking outrage about the abuse of MDWs, public debate quickly segued into
discussion of the social cost of women’s migration and the families they ‘leave behind’
(Withers, 2019). These twin pressures catalysed the implementation of a conditional
ban on migrant domestic work, known as the Family Background Report [FBR], later
that year. The FBR imposed minimum age restrictions on MDWs bound for various
destinations – 21 for Singapore, 23 for most Gulf States and 25 for Saudi Arabia – and
placed outright bans on the migration of women with children under the age of five
(International Labour Organization, 2018b). Women with children older than five are
required to complete a FBR, which involves identifying a ‘proper’ female guardian and
attaining spousal consent, which is then subject to government inspections and ap-
proval (International Labour Organization, 2018b).
The FBR is the first instance in which Sri Lanka has sought to restrict women’s mi-
gration, reflecting a hesitancy to disrupt the country’s economic reliance on domestic
worker migration. Indeed, the introduction of the FBR has overseen a sharp decline in
official domestic worker departures – from 138,000 per year in 2013 to 72,000 in 2017
(Ministry of Foreign Employment, 2017) – and a corresponding dip in remittance in-
flows, which have effectively flatlined since 2014 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL),
2018). This slowdown has prompted questions about the economic viability of the mi-
gration ban at a time when Sri Lanka’s external debt has reached record heights and
additional foreign exchange receipts are sorely needed to offset trade deficits and stabil-
ise a depreciating currency. At the same time, the FBR has done little to protect the
welfare of MDWs: there is evidence of an increasing number of women circumventing
the ban by migrating to the Gulf through irregular channels that are both riskier and
more costly (International Labour Organization, 2018b; Weeraratne, 2016). Given these
shortcomings, the FBR appears to have succeeded only in mollifying patriarchal unease
about ‘female breadwinners’ and bringing domestic worker migration into alignment
with gender norms embedded in Sri Lankan political discourse (Abeyasekera & Jaya-
sundere, 2015).
Comparative policy analysis
The analysis of restrictions imposed on MDWs from the four country studies presented
in the previous section showcases complexity within our overarching model of a migra-
tion ban policy cycle. The repeated and enduring use of migration bans by these and
other countries shows that, regardless of efficacy, restrictions remain the main policy
lever for many labour-sending states and suggests the possibility of policy learning or
policy convergence through emulation. As countries of origin have to balance appeas-
ing patriarchal norms at home while considering the economic consequences of labour
migration for the country, this policy allows for a performative change to satisfy the
public without addressing the root causes of the problem. Policy convergence and di-
vergence can be seen across the four countries of origin, which together reveal two
prominent policy narratives: of labour diplomacy and of patriarchal states as ‘protector’.
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The Philippines presents the clearest example of the former narrative. In recent years,
the state has used bans as a form of labour diplomacy and signal to Filipino citizens
that it is committed to taking strong action. It has negotiated and signed the most bilat-
eral agreements and MOUs after exerting diplomatic pressure on host countries. The
Philippines’ strong bargaining power largely stems from the global labour market’s de-
mand for well-educated and English-speaking Filipina domestic workers, noted for their
‘modern’ appearance and professionalism (Ireland, 2018). Therefore, the superior mar-
ket position of Filipina MDWs has helped to increase the state’s influence and embol-
dened the Philippines to mount a more forceful defence of their interests. However,
while negotiations are successful on some occasions, such pressure does not always re-
sult in the implementation of systematic changes to prevent future exploitation and
deaths. The country-specific bans have often been lifted after the receiving country re-
sponds by recruiting domestic workers of other nationalities from competing countries
of origin. Accordingly, the Philippine government’s structural dependence upon an
overseas labour force, along with the short-term benefits of remittances, constrains the
extent to which it is able to take meaningful action and strengthen the rights of
workers abroad.
The latter narrative of ‘patriarchal state’ can be seen in the cases of Nepal and Sri
Lanka. In contrast to the Philippines, both countries have a fragile market position and
consequently less bargaining power with receiving states. Ireland (2018) points to the
global labour market’s more modest valuation of Sri Lankan domestic workers due to
their lower educational qualifications, limited proficiency in foreign languages like Eng-
lish, skin colour and religious makeup, rendering them less desirable to foreign em-
ployers. Nepal and Sri Lanka’s restrictions, therefore, reflect a more protectionist style
of policymaking, grounded in patriarchal norms that construct migrant women as indi-
viduals who need protection and surveillance.
In Nepal, women’s migration is highly stigmatised, fuelled by media reports on mi-
grant women facing sexual violence in destination countries that equate their migration
with trafficking/prostitution (Gioli et al., 2017). While traditional family structures have
modernised in recent years, particularly in urban areas, gender stereotypes and patri-
archal practices discouraging women’s mobility and education persist in rural settings.
For instance, a woman’s role in more traditional Hindu communities in the Terai tends
to be confined to the domestic sphere, in contrast to the Newari and Tibeto-Burman
communities where women are more economically active (Gioli et al., 2017). Nepal’s
migration policies and bans are rooted in concern for women’s ijaat (social honour), a
concept that is closely tied to their perceived sexual purity within the context of histor-
ically dominant high-caste Hinduism. Grossman-Thompson (2016) explains how a
woman’s honour can be assured in the domestic sphere through social surveillance by
her parents and relatives, while being outside of the home is grounds for social censure
and an indication that a woman lacks ijaat. Consequently, Nepal’s restrictions on
women’s labour migration uphold gender norms and cultural narratives of social
honour.
Sri Lanka’s restrictions are also couched in terms of protecting the welfare of domes-
tic workers abroad, but this appears secondary to the preservation of traditional family
structures and gender norms that bind them. By banning the migration of women with
young children, the FBR ‘postulates a scenario in which women working less and caring
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more comprises an ideal solution to the mistreatment of MDWs and the care needs of
their children’ (Withers, 2019, 331). Prohibiting women’s foreign employment where
migration would impair the performance of care activities, the FBR is logically consist-
ent with a deeper patriarchal metanarrative entwined in Sri Lankan nationalism, public
discourse and state policy. More fundamentally, by regulating women, and not men,
the policy enforces traditional gender norms by placing the provision of childcare and
the wellbeing of the family squarely on women’s shoulders.
Indonesia appears to adopt an approach that intersects both narratives of paternalism
and diplomatic negotiation. The state’s bargaining power is gradually increasing with
its dominant share of the Malaysian labour market for domestic work and growing
preference for ‘low cost’ and ‘obedient’ Indonesian MDWs in West Asia, amid com-
plaints that Filipina MDWs are ‘too assertive’ (Ireland, 2018). For instance, Indonesia
successfully negotiated revised MOUs with Malaysia and Saudi Arabia after imposing
bans on the migration of domestic workers, allowing them to keep their passports,
communicate freely with their families, and a weekly rest day (Elias, 2013). The Indo-
nesian government’s promotion of domestic worker migration and reliance on their re-
mittances, however, sits uncomfortably with its depiction of women as dependent upon
their husbands and belonging in the domestic sphere despite their increasing economic
contributions to the household (Platt, 2018). This is evident by the stipulation that
women must have the express permission of their husband or father in order to mi-
grate overseas, and women with children younger than 6 months old are forbidden
from migrating in some areas of Indonesia. Therefore, akin to the restrictions in Sri
Lanka, women’s mobility in Indonesia is seen as incompatible with their maternal role.
It could be argued that while the stated intent of Indonesia’s migration restrictions is to
‘protect’ women MDWs following a ‘crisis event’, the ideological intent seems to be
aligned with reinforcing traditional gender norms.
The two overarching narratives present across our country studies – of labour send-
ing states as ‘negotiator for’ or ‘protector of’ women MDWs – are each informed by
differing political objectives that, in turn, determine the relative efficacy of migration
bans as a policy measure. For states primarily motivated by a perceived need to reaffirm
patriarchal gender norms, migration bans may be ineffective in restricting women’s mo-
bility (i.e. due to the availability of irregular migration pathways) but politically instru-
mental in policing gender norms. A cynical observer might suspect that, in these
contexts, the very appeal of migration bans is the opportunity to balance the pretence
of intervention against the preservation of remittance receipts. Meanwhile, for states
like the Philippines that have used migration bans to negotiate for better labour out-
comes, progress has been modest and episodic – undermined in large part by economic
constraints on the maintenance of bans. Moreover, by trading on the cultural capital of
Filipina domestic workers, this strategy hinges upon (and reinforces) a racialised hier-
archy of MDWs in the Gulf, to the effect of impeding other labour-sending states from
emulating these strategies effectively. Both approaches are therefore limited in their
ability to realise sustainable or lasting change to the social or economic regulation of
domestic worker migration, a reality evidenced by the frequency and repetition of mi-
gration ban policy cycles across the Indo-Pacific region. We determine that the funda-
mental challenge is that labour-sending states continue to act alone, or in competition
with one another, in a situation of pronounced power imbalance that mirrors capital-
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labour relations in the Gulf. Our analysis of the migration ban policy cycle and its inef-
fectiveness as a form of advocacy therefore strengthens longstanding calls for labour-
sending states to collaboratively engage in multilateral bargaining as a ‘high road’ to
achieving rights and protections for migrant workers.
Conclusion: from competition to collaboration
The comparative analysis of the four country case studies illustrates the realities
labour-sending states face while making policy decisions related to banning women do-
mestic workers from migrating overseas. Both the domestic politics and patriarchal
norms surrounding the role of women in society, as well as a power asymmetry be-
tween labour-sending and receiving countries, are key factors driving the decisions of
countries of origin and shaping their ability to negotiate superior rights protection. The
migration bans in each of the four labour-sending states exemplify their contradictory
stance on women’s role in national development as remittance generators, and the
moral discourses that underscore women’s labour overseas as incompatible with their
roles of wife, mother and nurturer. While origin states can and do intervene in the
form of migration bans as a mechanism to ‘protect’ women domestic workers, their
interest in sustaining remittances limits how forcefully they push for better rights pro-
tection in destination states. Labour-sending states are well aware that migration bans
are grossly ineffectual at preventing women domestic workers from migrating overseas,
but instead drive the process underground and push more workers to pursue unauthor-
ised, and riskier, migration routes. Yet, such reactionary policies are a more convenient
option than making the necessary structural changes within the home country and
reforming current migration policy and practice.
When states implement bans as a form of labour diplomacy, the receiving state often
responds by simply increasing its recruitment of domestic workers from other labour-
sending countries prepared to accept lower wages and inferior working conditions, ra-
ther than agreeing to improve protection. When receiving states are able to choose be-
tween a range of countries to satisfy their labour needs, this diminishes the bargaining
power of sending states to establish minimum terms and conditions of employment to
protect migrant workers overseas. Labour-sending states have so far worked in conflict
and engaged in ‘underselling’ the rights of migrant workers to receiving countries
through separate bilateral labour agreements, in order to ensure their share of an in-
creasingly crowded labour market.
Negotiating collectively, rather than competing for market share, would provide send-
ing states with more influence and allow them to implement the same model employ-
ment contracts, including reference wages and superior working conditions. This
would prevent host states from undercutting such standards and recruiting from other
sending countries. Regional Consultative Processes, such as the Colombo Process and
Abu Dhabi Dialogue, are forums that afford labour-sending states the opportunity to
come together and identify common ground on issues related to migrant workers. Ul-
timately, adopting harmonised positions through regional agreements that challenge
the ever-shifting hierarchy of remuneration rates and conditions of employment across
different states is more beneficial for all labour-sending countries in the long-term.
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